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The Transformations of Messianic Revolt and 
the Founding of the Ming Dynasty 
JOHN W. DARDESS 
IN 1368, after seventeen years of civil war, the recently established native Ming Dynasty of Chu Yuan-chang at last forced the heirs of Genghis Khan and their 
Yuan Dynasty from the dragon throne of China. The Yuan emperor and some rem-
nants of the Yuan imperial establishment abandoned Ta-tu (Peking) during the night 
of September 10, and reached the pillaged summer capital of Shang-tu on September 
27, after a disconsolate and rain-soaked journey.1 Further harassment by Ming forces 
at length compelled the Yuan court to withdraw from Shang-tu and retreat further 
north to Ying-ch'ang, which it reached on July 23, 1369.2 The Yuan emperor, after a 
reign of thirty-six years, died on May 23, 1370, a few weeks before Ming troops suc-
ceeded in taking Ying-ch'ang.3 For some years thereafter the Yiian, in spite of its 
retreat to Mongolia, continued to consider itself the legitimate reigning dynasty in 
China. The reign-title of Hsiian-kuang which the next emperor adopted shows that 
the Yuan still hoped, too late, for a dynastic revival or "restoration" (chung-hsing); 
for Hsiian-kuang alluded to King Hsiian of Chou and Emperor Kuang-wu of Han, 
who "restored" their respective dynasties.4 
But it was the former peasant rebel Chu Yuan-chang, with his capital in the city 
later known as Nanking, who was in fact emperor of China. The new dynasty which 
he established bore a strange name. Almost all earlier dynastic names had official 
explanations; not so the Ming.5 The vagueness must have been deliberate and politi-
cal. One can derive at least two sorts of meaning from the word "ming"—on the one 
hand, philosophical and Confucian, "bright, clear, discerning"; on the other, as Wu 
Han points out, religious and non-Confucian: a reference to the heretical ming-chiao 
(Manicheism) and the triumph of light (ming) over the darkness of the Yiian 
Dynasty.6 The "Ming" Dynasty thus easily accommodated the two very different 
social elements which the founder had brought together in the successful military 
and political movement which in 1368 succeeded the Yiian. 
At least in name, therefore, the Ming purported to represent both a Confucian 
desideratum and a Manichean-style fulfillment. It would, however, be wrong to say 
that in 1368 the Confucian and Manichean connotations equally balanced each other. 
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1 Liu Chi, Pei-hsiin ssu-chi (Yiin-ch'uang ts'ung-
k'o ed.), 1 a. Shang-tu was situated near To-lun, in 
present-day Inner Mongolia. 
2 Ibid., 5a. Ying-ch'ang lay west of present-day 
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s TTSL III, 1021. 
* Wada Sei, "Mindai no M5ko to Manshu" 
["Mongolia and Manchuria in the Ming"], Toashi 
Ronso (Tokyo, 1943), p. 307. 
5 A famous exception is Wang Mang's "Hsin" 
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9 Wu Han, "Ming-chiao yii Ta-Ming ti-kuo" 
["Manicheism and the Ming Empire"], Tu-shih 
cha-chi (Peking, 1961), p. 267. 
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In 1351, the Manichean promise had lain with a very different movement, the White 
Lotus Society. The White Lotus Society instigated the earliest in a series of riots 
which the Yuan Dynasty by itself proved incapable of suppressing. Manicheism (or 
Buddho-Manicheism) predicted the doom of the old order and the beginning of a 
new millennium of peace and prosperity. But Manicheism was itself incapable of 
providing the organizational rationale whereby the new era might actually be brought 
into being. Where Manicheism failed, Confucianism stepped in. It is the purpose 
of this article to discuss why and how this transformation came about. 
The rise of the Ming Dynasty has never been adequately discussed in terms of 
the larger context of events which took place in China between the years 1351 and 
1368. Such a discussion is not easy. The history of the early years of the rebellions 
must be painfully put together from a variety of diverse sources: the standard histor-
ies, local gazetteers, and various private writings. The official sources on the rise of 
the Ming (i.e., the shih-lu, or Veritable Records) are voluminous and relate every-
thing except those facts which we should most like to know. Using the shih-lu alone, 
for example, one would never discover that the Ming founder had gotten his start by 
leading an obscure side action on behalf of someone else's rebel dynasty and that he 
had subordinated himself to this dynasty until as late as 1366. There is a need to view 
the Ming movement not only in its own terms, as if its eventual success were somehow 
fated, but also in terms of the major changes in events in China as a whole. This 
larger sequence of events seems, generally, to be orderly and comprehensible. It can 
be seen that when the popular riots had run their course by 1354 and when the Yuan 
pacification effort had collapsed late in that year, the two main centers of the original 
rebel leadership abandoned their Buddho-Manichean ideologies and attempted to 
establish dynasties of the traditional Confucian sort. In this they failed; yet both of 
these movements in turn spawned side actions which made stronger bids for imperial 
power. One of these side actions was led by Ch'en Yu-liang, and the other by Chu 
Yuan-chang. Chu defeated Ch'en in 1364. By the time Chu declared the Ming 
Dynasty in January 1368, most of China proper was in his hands. In a sense, there-
fore, the name "Ming" encapsulates the whole history of the civil war from 1351. 
The Social Origins of the Anti-Yuan Risings. The White Lotus sectarians initiated 
a rising in 1351 which, thanks to Yuan ineptitude, spread and engulfed much of China 
by 1354. These riots have sometimes been termed peasant rebellions, which is not 
quite accurate.7 The Yuan rulers themselves perpetuated yet another misconception: 
long after their retreat to Mongolia, they preferred to remember that a grand and 
sudden conspiratorial rising had toppled them overnight and driven them out of 
China.8 Insofar as it reflects the paranoia which seized certain high Mongol digni-
taries when the risings first grew to serious proportions, this legend bears a certain 
psychological truth, but as a matter of historical fact it too is completely wrong.9 There 
was neither a planned conspiracy, nor was there a great rural jacquerie. The risings 
TCf. James P. Harrison, The Communists and 
Chinese Peasant Rebellions (New York, 1969), pp. 
$4. aio—ii, 228, 291-2. 
• H . Scrruyt, "Mongols in China during the 
Hung-wu Period," Melanges Chinoises et Bouddhi-
f*€t, XI (1956-59). 33. 
9 Mcng Ssu-ming, Yuan-tai she-hut chieh-cht 
chih-tu [The Social Class System of the Yuan 
Dynasty] (Peking, 1938), p. 219. Cf. also the un-
founded plot of 1310 to "kill all of the Tartars and 
Moslems" reported in YTC 41. I2b-i4a. 
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were unplanned, and the rebel groups were by no means largely peasant in composi-
tion at the initial stages. Rather, judging from what can be gathered from the sources, 
the early participants were footloose types, commonly associated with cities and mar-
ket towns. They were the uprooted and the disinherited. 
According to contemporary sources, some twenty local uprisings broke out in 
China after 1279, the year of the Yiian unification of South China.10 In the majority 
of these, the leaders are reported to have incited their followers with religious or 
magical propaganda—prophecies of doom, claims of personal divinity, assurances 
of magical protection, and so forth. In some cases, the leaders went so far as to adopt 
dynastic names and reign titles, thus advertising an overt political challenge to the 
incumbent dynasty. Of these risings, four can be linked either with the White Lotus 
Society, or else with leaders who proclaimed the imminent descent into the world 
of the Maitreya Buddha, an article of faith preached by the White Lotus. What the 
sources do not tell us is what sort of people took part in these affairs, or why. 1 1 We 
are simply given names, dates, and a few indications of the leaders' political or reli-
gious pretensions. It would be very difficult to make any meaningful general state-
ments on the basis of information as meager as this. 
Yet the problem can, in an overall way, still be approached. The Yiian Dynasty 
and the Confucian scholar-officials did look upon certain social situations, and some 
sectors of society, with apprehension. For its part, the dynasty appears to have been 
particularly concerned with the immediate problem of unauthorized crowds, and the 
scholar-officials with a long-range but related problem, a superabundance of socially 
parasitic elements. 
The Yiian tien-chang12 indicates the dynasty's view that crowds should not gather 
without official knowledge and permission. For example, the government was con-
cerned that two great Buddhist convocations, held illegally in Shensi province in 
1309 and 1311, attracted large numbers of "mixed crowds" (men and women, reli-
gious and lay) into an area in which food was in short supply and armed protection 
insufficient.13 Similarly, religious pilgrimages to the sacred Mount Tai in Shantung 
brought hordes of peasants, artisans, merchants, singing girls, army deserters, and 
boxers together for unauthorized ritual observances. The government feared that 
"when these ignorant and deluded people gather together, there will always be 
criminal elements among them. This situation not only offends the gods, but there 
is a danger of trouble starting."14 In South China, street processions on religious 
occasion elicited similar responses from the authorities. Here, the documents make 
explicit the connection between crowd gathering and the sort of political-religious 
"rebellion" mentioned above15 Regulations against such gatherings were repeatedly 
issued.16 There were also official injunctions against the writing and dissemination 
10 YS, YTC, and the anonymous Chao-pu tsung-
lu. On this latter work, see H. Franke, "Some As-
pects of Chinese Private Historiography," Historians 
of China and Japan, ed. W. G. Beasley and E. G. 
Pulleyblank (London, 1961), p. 1 19. Franke trans-
lates the title: "General Acount of Police Actions." 
1 1 The rebellion of Ts'ai Wu-chiu in 1315, how-
ever, appears to have had the backing of the 
Kiangsi landlord gentry as their means of protest-
ing an impending land survey: see H. F. Schur-
mann, The Economic Structure of the Yiian 
Dynasty (Cambridge, 1956), p. 32. 
1 2 The Yuan tien-chang is a corpus of Yiian ad-
ministrative law with illustrative cases. 
13 YTC 57.423-43^ 
1* YTC 57.56t>-57a. 
15 YTC 57.54a-b; hsin-chi, hsing-pu 90a. 
16 YTC 57.43b, 45b, 46b; hsin-chi, hsing-pu 84a; 
Tung-chih t'iao-kp (Peking, 1930), 27.2ib-22a; 
28.14b-! 6a. 
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of heretical religious works and prophetical books predicting the rise and fall of 
dynasties.17 There is nothing novel or startling in the Yuan attitude toward popular 
gatherings and religious heresies; similar attitudes were adopted by earlier (and 
later) dynasties. Yet it is significant that the government was suspicious, above all, 
of urban gatherings and mass religious pilgrimages. We find no regulations against, 
for example, peasant protest movements or rural tenant-farmer insurrections—a fact 
which can hardly occasion surprise since, as H. F. Schurmann points out, such move-
ments were not at all common during the Yuan period.18 
Probably because of the more intimate concern of the scholar-officials with the 
perennial Confucian task of maintaining an orderly and docile peasant society, these 
persons on their own probed a bit more deeply into aberrant social phenomena than 
did the dynasty, which was interested mainly in the immediate issue of its own secur-
ity and which confined itself largely to the issuing of prohibitory regulations.1* 
Indeed, Confucians were particularly sensitive to the problem of social parasitism 
since it was they who in the classical social hierarchy were the chief parasites and 
the chief recipients of the produce and services of the other classes. Generally, Con-
fucian doctrine demanded a maximum of producing peasants and tolerated only a 
theoretical minimum of artisans and merchants. Although the latter two elements 
were still considered part of legitimate society, the poorer members—small itinerant 
craftsmen, vendors, peddlers, etc.—tended to be lumped together in the Confucian 
mind with the followers of such despised occupations as begging, acting, musician-
ship, prostitution, or yamen-running. These latter occupations were outside of legiti-
mate society; in fact, those engaging in them constituted something close to 
hereditary castes.20 A contemporary scholar-official, Hu Chih-yu, offered a long list 
of parasitic social classes which he observed in North China late in the thirteenth 
century.11 Wang Chieh wrote in alarm and outrage of the "shiftless young scoun-
drels" (wu4ai o-skao) and "drifters in trivial occupations" (yu-shou mo-shih) that 
he saw in North China. Young men, he said, were abandoning the agricultural pur-
suits of their forbears and were migrating to the cities where their pursuit of 
gambling and vice eventually compelled them to learn fisticuffs or swordfighting 
in preparation for a life of crime.22 The Yuan ticn-chang noted: "if there is someone 
especially proficient in the use of spears and sticks, everyone pays him money and 
begs him to become his master.. . . If violent customs are not practiced and the arts 
of violence not transmitted, then the people will be tame and risings will not 
occur... 
In sum, there are notices concerning a number of riots that took place in the Yuan 
period after 1279, and there is evidence that the government and certain of the 
11YS sa.lt>; ioj .nb-iaa; Tung^hih tiao-ko 
18.19b; Wang Y0a, Chiwehitu cht (Sra-pu ts'ung-
k'aa t d ) , S6.jia; Paul Ratchneviky, Urn Cod* its 
Ymm (Pirn, I*J7>, Pfx btwnr-ri; YTC 3 1 . 14k 
1 1 Schurmann, p. 12 . 
^Nott , however, that during the reign of Qwbi-
lat (1160-94) the ywirmmm attempted to extend 
c a m * 4mm to the village lerd through the tnati-
totmn «f * t #Ar (community) •ymm, which in 
t44*km to iacwicttwig bettor ianamg mctboda was 
iatofeM to act aa a police ayvtun and curb thtfdeaa 
and immoral behavior. See Schurmann, pp. 43-48. 
w See Tung-tui Ch'ii, "Chine* Clau Structure 
and its Ideology," Chinese Thought and Institutions, 
ed. J. K. Fairbank (Chicago, i ^ 7 > » PP- 133 -50 . 
1 1 Hu Chih-yu, Tnwshsn t*-ch'u*u-chi (San-i-
t'ang ts'ung-ahu ed.), i i . a i b . The biography oi 
Hu Chih-yu (d. 1 1 9 3 ) is in YS ch. 170. 
» Wang Chieh, Wang Wen<hung ch* (S»u-k*u 
ch'uan-thu chen-pen ed.), 6.7a, u b , n h - 1 4 * . 9m 
YS ch. 17S for ha* biography, 
aa YTC 57.50k 
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scholar-officials considered cities, market towns, and religious centers as areas of 
special social danger, owing mainly to the concentration in those places of persons 
of ambiguous social status. These people were particularly susceptible to religious 
heresies and to millenarian propaganda. Upon occasion, religious or millenarian 
belief found overt political expression in riot or rebellion. 
It remains to consider the White Lotus Society, and its part in the popular risings 
of 1351. By late Yiian times the White Lotus Society in North China purveyed a 
heretical and composite messianic ideology which embodied at least two main ele-
ments. The first centered about an ancient belief in the imminent descent into the 
world of the Maitreya Buddha and his establishment of an earthly paradise, free of 
all disease, strife, suffering, and hardship.24 Somehow connected with this idea was 
the Manichean belief in the coming triumph of the forces of light over the forces of 
darkness, over which a Prince of Radiance (ming wang) would preside.25 Second, 
there was the idea, not clearly millenial in its implications, of a restoration of the 
defunct Northern Sung Dynasty (960-1126). The Han family, hereditary chiefs of 
the White Lotus, claimed direct blood descent from the Sung Emperor Hui-tsung, 
who in 1126 had been captured by the Jiircheds and exiled to Manchuria. It is tempt-
ing to see in this last motif an appeal on the part of the Society for the support of the 
peasants, who may have regarded the Sung Dynasty as a golden age of justice and 
prosperity. Unfortunately, for this period there is very little reliable documentation 
about the White Lotus Society or its ideology. None of its heretical scripture survives, 
and only one genuine proclamation: that issued to the Korean court in 1359 26 
About the kinds of people involved in the White Lotus Society in the north, we 
know nothing. The Han family originally had its seat at Luan-ch'eng, but sometime 
during the Yiian period it was exiled to Yung-nien, about fifty miles southwest, 
probably as punishment for its activities.27 The control of the Han family did not 
extend into the Yangtze region, which did not appear to have a comparable organi-
zation until a heretical monk-healer by the name of P'eng Ying-yu helped to found 
one at Ma-ch'eng in 1338 or shortly thereafter.28 
We know a bit more about P'eng and his group in Ma-ch'eng than we do about 
the Han family's group in Yung-nien. An extant tale about P'eng Ying-yii describes 
at length his working of miracles and his evangelization on behalf of the Maitreya.29 
2 4 See the Fo-shuo Mi-lo hsia-sheng ching 
[Sutra on the Descent into Life of the Maitreya as 
Expounded by the Buddha], translated by Chu 
Fa-hu in the Western Chin period (A.D. 265-313), 
in Taisho shinshu dai zokyo, XIV, 421-23. 
2 5 For the fusion of Manicheism with Maitreya 
lore that came about during the S. Sung ( 1 127-
1278), see Shigematsu Toshiaki, "To-So jidai no 
Miroku kyohi" ["Maitreya Religious Bandits dur-
ing the Tang and Sung"], Shien, No. 3 (Dec. 
I93I)> P- 98. For a general view of heretical reli-
gion, C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society 
(Berkeley, 1967), pp. 229-43, is illuminating. 
26 Koryo sa (Tokyo, 1908-9), I, 596. I am ad-
vised that an important article on the history of the 
White Lotus will soon be published by Chan Hok-
lam of the Ming Biographical History Project. 
27 MS III, 1560. Luan-ch'eng is about 200 miles 
southwest of Peking. The Yiian government at times 
tolerated and at times suppressed the White Lotus; 
cf. Wu Han, "Yiian ti-kuo chih peng-k'uei yii 
Ming chih chien-kuo" ["The Collapse of the Yiian 
Empire and the Founding of the Ming"], Ch'ing-
hua hsiieh-pao, XI (May, 1936), p. 392. 
28 For a regional and ideological schema of 
Yiian secret society activity, see Shigematsu To-
shiaki, "So-Gen jidai no kokingun to Gemmatsu 
no Miroku-Hakuren kyohi ni tsuite" ["The Red 
Turban Army of Sung and Yiian and the Maitreya 
—White Lotus Religious Bandits of Late Yiian"], 
Shien, No. 27 (Nov. I94i),p. 140. 
29 Ch'iian Heng, Keng-shen wai-shih (Ts'ung-
shu chi-ch'eng ed.), p. 4; YS 39-I3b- H. Schulte-
Uffelage, Das Keng-shen Wai-shih. Eine Quelle 
zur Spaten Mongolenzeit (Berlin, 1963), should be 
used with caution owing to errors in translation and 
annotation. 
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He appears as the chief organizer of a rising which took place at Yiian-chou in Kiangsi 
province in 1338, in which he set up a figurehead "king" and through magical means 
sought to assure his men of immunity from attack.30 After the authorities put down 
this rising, P'eng escaped and made his way north to Ma-ch'eng, where according 
to a somewhat garbled account, he helped to organize a White Lotus Society.31 At 
Ma-ch'eng, P'eng became a mentor to a group which seems to have been a sworn 
brotherhood and was already in existence there. Among the members were the 
leader Tsou Fu-sheng, a blacksmith; Hsiang P'u-liieh, also known as Nu-erh, "son 
of a slave"; Ou Fu-hsiang, alias Tao-jen, "the Taoist"; Ch'en P'u-ts'ai, a fisherman 
(and father of the later warlord Ch'en Yu-liang); and Chao Fu-sheng, alias Shuang-
tao or "double-knife," to name a few.32 
It is evident that a nucleus of rebel leadership had begun to emerge at Ma-ch'eng. 
The men gathered around Feng were, no doubt, of that vague category which the 
Confucians would label "drifters in trivial occupations;" at least none of them is 
mentioned as being engaged in the "fundamental occupation" of agriculture. P'eng's 
group on the Yangtze resembled that of the Han family in North China very closely 
in ideological matters, except that there was no program for a Sung restoration in 
the south; in their organization, however, the two groups appear to have been com-
pletely independent. In any event, these were the two most important instigators 
of mass revolt in 1351; and in 1355, both groups attempted to transform themselves 
into organized Confucian imperial movements by establishing separate "dynasties."33 
The Popular Outbreaks (1351-1354). The Yiian government itself provided the 
opportunity for the crowd gathering that set the scene for the 1351 rebellions. In 
the spring of that year, on the order of the Chancellor of the Right Toghto, a labor 
force consisting of some 170,000 men was called up to rechannel the Yellow River, 
which in 1344 had shifted its course to the north of the Shantung peninsula, causing 
widespread flooding and destruction.34 It was an unfortunate time for such a project. 
There had been an increase in banditry in recent years, particularly in the Shantung 
area, and certain of these outlaw groups had succeeded in openly demonstrating the 
ineffectiveness of the once-feared Yiian armies by their provocative actions.35 In 
1348, moreover, when the Yiian government failed embarrassingly in its attempt to 
suppress the Chekiang pirate Fang Kuo-chen, it granted him a title instead and thus 
* ChMkn Heng, p. 4. Yuan-chou is now I-ch'un, 
1 1 See the notice in Yuan-chou ju-cfuh (Kiangsi, 
5-1 ab. Ma-ch'cng is in present-day Hupei 
proriace. 
"Ob'iem ChVn-i, Kuo-ck'ao ch'iin-ksiung shih-
hkk (Shih-yuan ts'ung-shu ed.), 3.21; Chao Fang, 
TuatHbaa ts'un-kao (ms. ed.), "K'o-fu Hsiu-ning 
V*? ("Stefe on the Reconquest of Hsiu-
ataf Hsien"), BO ch. or p. There are other ref-
tnacm to Huang. TTSL I, 30, 197; Ming Tax-tsu 
tktk-ln chi [Collation notes to the Ming 
dtt-fa], ed. Huang Chang-chien (Acade-
mim Sintca, 1^5) , I, 57. I am indebted to Prof. 
Km Ting-yec of Academia Sinica for pointing out 
to Me that the ffm element in the rebels' names sug-
fn«i that &cy were a sworn brotherhood. Yet not 
all of the rebels bore this as part of their name. 
Thus there were Ni Wen-chun, a fisherman; and 
Hsiung T'ien-jui, from a family of registered mu-
sicians. See Yeh Tzu-ch'i, Ts'ao-mu-tzu (Ch'ing ms. 
ed.), 3.8b; MS III, 1567. 
83 For a slighdy different interpretation, cf. F. W. 
Mote, The Poet Kao Ch'i (Princeton, 1962), p. 13. 
84 YS 42.6b; 66.ia-b. I hope in a later study to 
deal with the important subject of late Yuan poli-
tics. 
85 Cf. Kuo Qonichi's exploit in YS 4i.4a-b; and 
that of the Hua-shan bandits near Nanking in YS 
41.13a, and Tao Tsung-i, Cho-\eng lu (Ts'ung-
shu chi-ch'eng ed.), p. 443. Kuo "Qonichi" (lit. 
"shepherd") is a not untypical hybrid Sino-Mon-
golian name of the Yiian period. 
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in effect surrendered to him control over its own food supply.38 When under these 
circumstances Toghto not only called out a huge labor force but also then even neg-
lected to provide adequate military protection on the spot, he was indeed asking for 
trouble. 
The White Lotus chieftain Han Shan-t'ung did not pass up the opportunity 
which the Yuan government afforded him. He and his followers came south from 
Yung-nien to the scene of the diggings in order to win converts from among the 
laborers. One device which they used was to bury a stone figurine of a one-eyed man 
at the scene of the works where the laborers would be sure to dig it up. On the back 
of the figurine were inscribed the words: "Do not say that the stone man has only 
one eye; when this is dug up, the empire will rebel."37 This was apparently intended 
as a reply to a popular children's rhyme which had been circulating since 1350. The 
rhyme went: " A stone man with one eye; when they channel the Yellow River, the 
empire will rebel."38 That Han Shan-t'ung did not succeed in winning over very 
many of the workers is evident from the fact that the project continued on without 
interruption until it was completed in December 1351; but he did induce some of 
them to desert, possibly those whom the officials had deprived of their rations39 
The White Lotus Society was again active after about a decade of quiescence. As 
can be gathered from the tale of the figurine, it was predicting a collapse of the reign-
ing dynasty. It was spreading Buddho-Manichean messianic propaganda about the 
sxpected arrival of the Maitreya and his earthly paradise. Its hereditary chieftain 
Han Shan-t'ung boasted direct descent from the emperors of the Northern Sung. 
And this was not all. A direct appeal to the poor and oppressed was put forth in the 
slogan: "While poverty is extreme in Kiangnan, wealth is boasted in Sai-pei."40 
Although the White Lotus insurgents went so far as to "sacrifice a white horse 
and a black ox, and make oaths to Heaven and Earth," and to wrap red cloths around 
their heads (hence their epithet, "Red Turbans") and burn incense in honor of the 
Maitreya (hence their other epithet, "Incense Army"), they did not strike out on 
their own in open and overt rebellion until local officials forced their hand by seizing 
and arresting Han Shan-t'ung.41 The rest of the Red Turbans then decided that they 
had either to rebel at once or be arrested in turn. On May 28,1351, barely a week after 
the assembling of the 170,000 laborers, the rebels captured the Huai-area city of Ying-
chou 42 After Han Shan-t'ung's arrest, his wife took their son Han Lin-erh and fled 
for safety.43 The leadership of the rebellion was then taken over by two men: Liu 
Fu-t'ung, of whom nothing is known, except that he was a sectarian (yao-jen) and 
a native of Ying-chou; and Tu Tsun-tao, of whom one account relates that he had 
36 YS 143.15b; 186.2a; MS III, 1570. 
87 Reported in Yeh Tzu-ch'i, 3.7b. 
88 Reported in YS 66.na-b. It would be difficult 
to assert the authenticity of the figurine story. 
39 YS 66.2a; Yeh Tzu-ch'i, 3.7b. 
40 Yeh Tzu-ch'i, 3.8a. Kiangnan and Sai-pei, 
here used in a figurative sense, are antithetical geo-
graphical expressions. It seems safe to interpret 
them as referring to the common people on the 
one hand, and the Mongol government on the 
other. This introduces both an anti-Mongol note 
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once submitted a memorial to the government recommending reforms in the mili-
tary system and had been offered a minor official post as a result.4'4 
It was twenty days before the Yiian emperor could be reached to authorize the 
dispatch of forces against the rebels, and thus the government lost the initiative.45 
Before the summer was over, the rebels had captured a large bloc of territory along 
the upper reaches of the Huai and its tributaries, comprising some half dozen cities 
and about 50,000 square miles of land. What might otherwise have been only one 
more item in the catalogue of Yiian "religious riots" had turned into a major insur-
rection. 
It is possible to pinpoint some of the mechanics of this phase of the rebellion. 
The original nucleus of White Lotus partisans began to gather concentric rings of 
followers, or Red Turbans. There were the deserters from the Yellow River project; 
there were numbers of clerks recently dismissed from their jobs as a result of a gov-
ernment policy of closing down unnecessary offices; there were "illiterate loafers 
from the countryside" who overran at least one city, looted or threatened to loot the 
homes of the rich and forced them to inscribe their banners for them 46 Local bandits 
took advantage of the uproar to come into the open and plunder.47 Both men and 
women took part in forcing open the local government granaries and in the killing of 
local officials. In some places, people gathered in crowds of hundreds to chant the 
Lotus Sutra, possibly in order to hasten on the Maitreya's arrival.48 A contemporary 
commentator has it that because of the great inequality between the rich and the 
poor, many of the poor were "glad to join the rebellion."49 
Word of the conflagration in the upper Huai area soon spread and ignited sec-
ondary centers of rebellion. Hsii-chou, an important city of the eastern Huai located 
on the Grand Canal, fell on August 31 to Sesame-seed Li (so called because his fam-
ily owned a granary of sesame); Chao Chiin-yung, a she-chang, or community 
leader; and Feng Ta, a kind of local strongman.50 Local crops could not be planted 
owing to a labor shortage caused by the Yellow River project, and promised govern-
ment relief was not forthcoming. One account emphasizes, however, that the three 
men were after "riches and honor" and decided to seize Hsii-chou only after hearing 
of the events to the west. At Hsii-chou they set up a banner, recruited a mob and, 
soon after, overran some half dozen cities of the eastern Huai.51 
Other rebel power centers sprang up in the eastern Huai area. Hao-chou fell in 
March 1352 to a group of rebels which included Kuo Tzu-hsing, whose father was a 
well-to-do fortune-teller and mother a rich family's unwanted blind daughter. Kuo 
was a "swashbuckling type who enjoyed keeping retainers about him." Indeed, Kuo 
attached to himself the future Ming founder Chu Yuan-chang when he came to 
Hao-chou seeking to join the rebels.52 During 1353, the ex-salt-smuggler Chang 
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Shih-ch'eng and his brothers seized control of a rebel movement originally led by 
one Wang K'o-jou, a member of a wealthy clan of T'ai-chou. Chang by 1353 occu-
pied an arc of territory which stretched north of the important Grand Canal and 
Yangtze River city of Yang-chou. Early in 1354, Chang declared a Great Chou 
Dynasty, with its capital at the Grand Canal city of Kao-yu.53 With the Grand Canal 
blocked by the rebel occupation of Hsii-chou and Kao-yu and the sea lanes under 
the control of the pirate Fang Kuo-chen (and after 1354, Fang for the first time 
established himself permanently on land), the Yuan capital lost its food supply 
entirely.54 
Finally, P'eng Ying-yii's group at Ma-ch'eng rose up in the autumn of 1351 and 
triggered a social explosion of truly stupendous proportions. A cloth peddler of 
impressive size and demeanor by the name of Hsu Shou-hui was discovered by Pceng 
and his men (according to one account, Hsu was observed emitting a strange light 
while he was taking a bath in a river) and was installed as figurehead emperor of 
the rebels' newly declared Tien-wan Dynasty.55 "Tien-wan," meaning something 
like "heaven-preserved," as a dynastic name was as untraditional as the riots carried 
out in its behalf were unprecedented. By piecing together notices from the Yuan 
shih, the local gazetteers, and the extant private writings of the landlord gentry, one 
can get a good if not unbiased view of the full extent of these disorders. In all, the 
Tien-wan occupied some 200,000 square miles from the area of the modern province 
of Hunan east to the sea. This territory was not under centralized control, for at this 
stage the Tien-wan in reality was not a government. From the Ma-ch'eng center 
there marched forth at least six different rebel columns (one was led by Tsou P'u-
sheng and P'eng Ying-yii in person; it seems that P'eng was killed enroute).56 As 
each column proceeded, it picked up hordes of new adherents (Red Turbans) from 
among the bandits, idlers, and "shiftless and evil youths," together with others, pre-
sumably peasants, who were "stupid and deluded," as the gentry writers put it. 
Everywhere, "shiftless scoundrels" took advantage of the situation to rise up, fashion 
makeshift weapons, dress themselves in red cloth, and join the conflagration. 
It is not difficult to discover that the chief victims of this mass outburst were the 
local officials on the one hand and the Chinese landlord gentry on the other. As for 
the officials, it was the policy at least of the Tien-wan commander Hsiang P'u-liieh 
(or Hsiang Nu-erh) to humiliate them publicly by forcing them to acknowledge 
Hsu Shou-hui as emperor and killing them if they refused.57 The landlord gentry 
were occasionally massacred58; more often, as is evident from the private writings 
of the early Ming period, the rebels simply pillaged and destroyed thier homes, 
because the owners had fled beforehand. An inscription describes succinctly the rebel 
entry into the city of Shao-wu, located in Fukien near the Kiangsi border: 
On June 3, 1352, they sent bandits waving flags and carrying placards to the 
border to Shao-wu, where they forced some three hundred commoners to carry 
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white cudgels and enter the city shouting and yelling. Upon hearing of the 
approach of the rebels, the officials and people took their families and fled ahead 
of time. The rebels took advantage of this and occupied the local government 
yamen. The next day, in order to gather more adherents, the rebel leaders 
announced that they were going to overthrow the rich and benefit the poor. Since 
the penniless folk all wanted riches, and all of those nursing hatreds wanted 
revenge, they rose up in flocks to join the rebels. They soon gathered a large 
number of people and entered and plundered the homes of the wealthy. No one 
was spared.6® 
Yet it is also true that the anarchy unleashed by the T'ien-wan went deeper; there 
are reports of tenant-farmer insurrections, real jacqueries which were only remotely 
connected with the T'ien-wan riots.60 And too, in those places where the original 
followers of P'eng Ying-yii were able to maintain a presence, the religious element 
seems to have mitigated the class war aspects of the rebellion. Thus when Hsiang 
Fu-liieh entered the famous city of Hangchow, he and his men seem to have been 
more intent upon proselytizing than destroying. According to reports, they distrib-
uted copies of the "prophetical scriptures" and entered the names of the converts to 
the Maitreya faith into registers. On departing Hangchow, however, they were 
careful to take with them cartloads of gold and silk, together with official docu-
ments.61 Hsiang and his men continued north from Hangchow, opening granaries 
and distributing grain to the poor as they went.62 Hsiang was captured and executed 
shortly afterward while returning westward; his enraged followers then took 
revenge by destroying the villages of all those involved in his arrest63 
In sum, between the years 1351 and 1354, there took place largely disorganized 
and spontaneous revolts which engulfed the whole heartland of China from the 
Yellow River south. These rebellions were sparked by the White Lotus Society from 
two original centers, Yung-nien and Ma-ch'eng.64 As the rebellions spread, they 
picked up more and more followers: first the "shiftless" elements, as the Confucians 
termed them, who appear to have been mainly young fellows; then, these rioters in 
turn encouraged the outbreak of rural protest movements, including bandit activity 
and tenant farmer risings.65 According to the Ming founder Chu Yuan-chang's own 
account, "masses of the people dropped their farming, seized weapons, and ran to 
join the rebel leaders."66 The landlord gentry had upon occasion during the Yiian 
period supported, or threatened to support, local rebellions until their demands upon 
the government were met. It appears, however, that the popular rebellions of 1351 
and later took them by surprise. If the gentry attempted to make contact with the 
rebel leaders, they obviously did not succeed; indeed, they bore the brunt of the 
violence. In consequence, the gentry were obliged to side with the Yuan government 
**Sha>-wu ju-chih (Fukien, 1897), 13.20b. 
Chi, Yun-yang chi (ms. cd.), 8.34a-36a. 
• l C£. Tao Tsung-i, p. 437; Yang Wei-chen, 
Tung-wei-txu wen-chi (Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an cd.), 
22.14*-b; YS 42.18b. 
M Yin K'uci, Ch'iang-chai chi (ms. cd.), 4 ^ - 4 a ; 
alto cf. Wang Ch'ung-wu, "Lun Yuan-mo nung-
min ch'i-i ti fa-chan shui-picn chi ch'i tsai li-shih-
thang 10 ch'i ti chin-pu tso-yung" [ 'The Develop-
ment and Transformation of the Late Yiian Peasant 
Huings and their Progressive Effect on History"], 
Li-shih yen-chiu, No. 4 (1954), p. 99. 
68 Chao Fang, loc. cit., note 22 above. 
64 Actually, the whole area around Ma-ch'eng 
was declared Lien-t'ai (Lotus Platform) province, 
and the Tien-wan capital was established at Ch'i-
shui, a hsien about 40 miles south of Ma-ch'eng. 
65 On banditry as a social phenomenon, sec E. J. 
Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (New York, 1965). 
66 Quoted in Mcng Ssu-ming, p. 212. Chu's re-
mark applies to the area around Hao-chou. 
MESSIANIC REVOLT AND THE MING DYNASTY 549 
against the rioters. The cases of the pirate Fang Kuo-chen and the salt-smuggler 
Chang Shih-ch'eng were, however, a little different; neither was a sectarian adherent, 
and each quickly gained local support and established himself as a regional warlord. 
Yet there seems to have been a fundamental ambiguity in the early mass out-
breaks. If millennial doctrine was embraced and rebellion initiated by monks, arti-
sans, and people engaged in nonessential occupations, and these in turn incited other 
distressed groups, then it would also appear that the groups further removed from the 
core of the rebellion were the less firmly commited to it. The peasants were particu-
larly sway able; and herein lay the key to the next stage. There was no natural 
alliance between the local peasants and the local "shiftless elements" who guided 
invading Red Turbans to the homes of the rich and destroyed them. Indeed the 
local gentry, frightened by the rebels' approach, very frequently succeeded in patron-
izing the peasants, including especially the poorer ones, by spending their own 
resources upon them. Even more, peasants who had already joined the rebel ranks 
could be shamed, pardoned, and offered inducements to join the gentry side as mili-
tia. If there were competition between rebels and gentry for the allegiance of the 
peasants, the gentry would appear to have the advantage.67 
The Transformations of Popular Rebellion. The great riots briefly described 
above were for the most part ended by 1354. The Yuan government had, in the cir-
cumstances, no recourse but to allow the Chinese landlord gentry to recruit, train, 
and lead peasant militia forces (i-ping) against the marauding Red Turbans. These 
gentry-led militia, frequently in cooperation with local officials, succeeded in pacify-
ing large enclaves around the chief prefectural cities in China south of the Yangtze 
from 1354 onward, but in the process they left a highly fragmented pattern of polit-
ical power. No one man arose politically supreme in South China. In the Huai region, 
by contrast, the White Lotus advance was turned back by militia forces under the 
command of a landowner named Chaghan Temiir, a man apparently of Uighur 
origin.68 By the time of his assassination in 1362, Chaghan Temiir had succeeded in 
dominating the anti-rebel effort to such an extent that he was able to establish a war-
lord regime of his own over much of North China. After his death, his political and 
military machine passed into the hands of his nephew, Koko Temiir. 
Imperial Yuan armies under central control did see limited action against the 
Red Turban rebels in north and south. The Yuan court, moreover, attempted to 
maintain some control over the process of militia formation either by forming its 
own units, or by granting military rank to private individuals (often merchants) 
who were able to field a certain number of men 69 Yet the conclusion seems inescap-
able that the dynasty had, in spite of these efforts, allowed the preponderance of 
military power to fall into outside hands. The landlord gentry, hitherto forbidden 
any contact with military affairs, were now suddenly in charge of large bodies of mili-
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tia forces. As a result, the Chinese gentry and the Mongol imperial commanders 
soon found that their interests conflicted in spite of their common opposition to the 
Red Turbans. In addition, the Yiian government was in many cases unable to exert 
any real measure of control over its own militia units, which were obliged to see to 
their own food supply. Yiian militia commanders on the whole had to fend for 
themselves, and often they did not hesitate to disobey orders or even change sides if 
it suited their interests. Yiian hopes for a "restoration" could not, therefore, be placed 
in these men; only a Mongol of towering prestige, whose personal fortunes were 
intimately connected to the salvation of the dynasty, and who at the same time had 
support among the Chinese landlord gentry, had any real chance of reviving the 
Yuan state. 
It appeared for a time that the Chancellor of the Right Toghto himself might be 
this perspn. In August 1352, a full year after the beginning of the risings, Toghto 
received imperial permission to command an expedition against the rebel-occupied 
city of Hsii-chou. Leading a force of 20,000 men, including salt workers, river project 
laborers, and "city ruffians," Toghto recovered Hsii-chou on October 29.70 Then he 
made long and careful plans for the reduction of the other Grand Canal city of Kao-
yu, occupied by Chang Shih-ch'eng, and for this purpose he assembled a large army 
consisting of Koreans, Central Asians, and Tibetans in addition to the regular imper-
ial forces. But Toghto's whole career had built upon the opening of bureaucratic 
career opportunities to large numbers of officials (including especially many Chi-
nese) through his great projects—the Yellow River project of 1351 was one, and the 
Hsu-chou and Kao-yu campaigns can be considered as two others. These enterprises 
antagonized many conservative Mongols, who felt threatened by the influx of Chi-
nese in government. In December 1354, just as Kao-yu was about to succumb, 
Toghto's enemies engineered his downfall. He was divested of all ranks and titles and 
banished to his estates. Several contingents of his army deserted and turned outlaw. 
Whatever its real prospects, all hope for a Yiian restoration was now gone.71 
By 1354, none of the sectarian rebellions was in a flourishing state. The great 
mass outburst had run its course. In many places, particularly in South China, pacifi-
cation was nearly complete and reconstruction had already begun. The White Lotus 
rebels of the north now held little more than the city of Po-chou,72 and the T'ien-wan 
leaders, driven from their capital at Ch'i-shui, were forced to find refuge in the nearby 
mountains. When the Yuan government, by its dismissal of Toghto, decided not to 
sponsor the repression, it in effect forfeited its mandate and compelled the landlord 
gentry to discover new sources of leadership. 
We now arrive at a crucial point; into the vacuum which the Yiian Dynasty had 
created there now stepped the very rebel leadership elements which had originally 
opposed both the gentry and the dynasty. Now largely shorn of their former mass 
support, these leadership elements made a complete strategic reversal. They dropped 
their messianic programs and for the first time began to organize seriously. Instead 
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of attacking the landlord gentry, they now tried to win them over by building with 
their advice embryonic imperial regimes of the traditional kind. This new develop-
ment began shortly after the collapse of the Yuan campaign against Kao-yu. 
In the case of the Tien-wan, it is apparent that the new opportunities afforded 
the rebel leaders by the failure of the Yuan pacification effort produced a crisis within 
their camp; some of the old rebel chiefs were averse to the betrayal of their original 
messianic ideals and opposed the shift in strategy which the more opportunistic 
elements wanted. Consequently, it was necessary for the latter to shunt aside, or to 
murder, the advocates of the old messianism. Early in 1355, we find Ni Wen-chiin 
initiating this process within the Tien-wan camp. During 1355 and 1356, he recap-
tured a number of cities along the Yangtze west of Ch'i-shui and in the area of 
modern Hunan province; and after moving the Tien-wan capital west to Han-yang, 
he installed the emperor Hsu Shou-hui there as his captive. Ni failed in an attempt 
to induce the Yuan government to grant him the title of Administrator (pfing-chang) 
of Hukuang province. He also failed in an attempt to assassinate Hsu Shou-hui. 
Shortly after, Ni was himself murdered by a lieutenant, Ch'en Yu-liang, son of one 
of the original Ma-ch'eng brethren.73 
Ch'en Yu-liang, far from reversing the new T'ien-wan trend toward empire, 
continued it. But where Ni had sought to base his empire in the Hunan area, Ch'en 
concentrated upon the richer and more strategic area of Kiangsi to the east. By 1358 
he had taken most of it.74 Ch'en, however, expanded his territory very rapidly and 
sacrificed tight control for mere acreage. Instead of compelling the Kiangsi landlord 
gentry to trade their local power positions for posts within his central administra-
tion, Ch'en simply gave them offices and official seals and left them where they were. 
His conquests brought about the downfall only of the local Yuan officials. The gen-
try were therefore at liberty to negotiate with someone else as soon as Ch'en's leader-
ship drive should falter. One Kiangsi gentryman, who had built a village self-defense 
system, recruiting, supplying, and rewarding his own men, stated it this way: "The 
view of the local magnate (hao-chieh) is this—to rule his own area, await the purifi-
cation of the empire, and then choose carefully the one to whom he will render 
allegiance/'75 
By 1359, the revived T'ien-wan regime fell into distinct western and eastern 
halves, with the emperor Hsu Shou-hui and his supporters in control of the former 
and Ch'en Yu-liang in charge of the latter. In these circumstances, Hsu tried to trans-
fer his capital from Han-yang east to Lung-hsing (now Nan-ch'ang) in Kiangsi, 
in order to ensure the incorporation of Ch'en's newly won territory as well as Ch'en's 
own continued subordination to the T'ien-wan cause. Ch'en met the emperor half-
way, and there in a sudden move he murdered all of Hsu's close supporters, leaving 
the emperor a puppet in his hands. Ch'en Yu-liang then named himself King of Han, 
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appointed a central bureaucracy of his own, and established his capital at Chiang-
chou (now Chiu-chiang). 
The name "Han" is not without significance in this context. Much of Ch'en's 
support came from the Kiangsi landlord gentry, who had been supporters of the 
Yuan cause in 1352. The dynastic name "Tien-wan" was both ungainly and untra-
ditional. The name "Han," by contrast, recalled the first of China's great dynasties 
and was practically synonymous with China itself: an appeal to gentry rather than 
chiliastic lower-class sympathies. In 1360, while engaged in a major (and unsuccess-
ful) assault upon Chu Yuan-chang to his east, Ch'en dropped all pretense, assassi-
nated the former cloth peddler Hsu Shou-hui, and assumed for himself the position 
of emperor ol the Han Dynasty.7* The shift was now complete. The poor man's 
Ticn-wan had become the landlord gentryman's Han. Few symbols of the old order 
remained77 
The Ticn-wan was one sectarian leadership nucleus that underwent drastic trans-
formation after 1355. The other was the White Lotus Society of North China, which 
originally started the riots of 1351; and here the situation was a bit more complex, 
perhaps because we are more fully informed about certain parts of it. The White 
Lotus chieftains, it will be remembered, claimed descent from the Sung emperors; 
yet significantly it was not until 1355 that Liu Fu-t'ung and Tu Tsun-tao went so far 
as to establish formally a new Sung Dynasty. Han Lin-erh, in hiding since 1351, was 
enthroned as Great Sung Emperor with the reign title of Lung-feng (Dragon and 
Phoenix: both imperial symbols). The new Sung capital was established at Po-chou, 
not only because it was the only city the rebels were in firm control of, but probably 
also because ol its having been the capital of the ancient Sung state during the spring 
and autumn period (722-484 bJC.). Early in 1355, Liu murdered Tu and thus came 
into complete control of the Sung central government. There is no indication that 
Han lin-erh (commonly known as hsiao ming-tvang, or Lesser Prince of Radiance) 
ever wielded power in his own right.78 
Liu Fu-t'ungs Sung regime was short-lived but spectacular. His strategy was to 
make alliances with remaining rebel groups wherever they happened to be, give 
official ranks and badges of authority to their leaders, and assign them certain areas 
tor attack. Thus a group of rebels at Hsiang-yang on the middle Han River invaded 
the important Wei River valley of Shensi during 1356 and 1357; a £ r o uP 
Turbans located in the Liaotung Peninsula was invited to cross the Gulf of Chihli 
and occupy Shantung in 1357; anc* a group of Szechwan rebels known as Green 
Turbans during the same year marched north through the mountains and briefly 
overran the far western end of the Wei River valley.7® Liu himself mounted an offen-
sive north across the Yellow River and into the T'ai-hang mountains.80 During 1358, 
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while Liu moved the Sung government and imperial entourage into the former 
northern Sung capital of Pien-liang (K'ai-feng), his Shantung allies attacked and 
nearly succeeded in taking the Yiian capital, while a grand expedition under "Master" 
Kuan and "Broken-head" P'an overran the Fen River valley of Shansi.81 
The year 1358 marked the high point of the Sung effort; from 1359 there was a 
rapid decline. The very nature of the Sung strategy on the one hand, and the growing 
power of Chaghan Temiir on the other, quickly erased the fruits of conquest. The 
Sung capital of Pien-liang, together with the Sung empress, five thousand Sung 
officials and their families, and a large number of seals, tallies, and precious goods 
fell to Chaghan Temiir in September 1359.82 Liu Fu-t'ung and the figurehead 
emperor Han Lin-erh then fled south. Only in Shantung, apparently, did the Sung 
have time to set up the rudiments of an orderly traditional-style administration: a tax 
of one-fifth upon all private lands; the establishment of military-agricultural colonies; 
the honorific burial of Yiian zealots; the search for employable talents.83 But the 
chief Sung provincial official in Shantung was murdered by a rival in 1359, and Shan-
tung fell into anarchy.84 The invasions of Korea in 1359 and 1361 (the latter led by 
Kuan and P'an) were unsuccessful individual actions.85 
The Sung imperial movement itself failed, yet its activities indirectly benefited 
other pretenders. Through its wide-ranging attacks it kept the Yiian Dynasty fighting 
for its life, and Chaghan Temiir tied down in North China. The Huai region immed-
iately to the south, the scene of the 1351 risings, was now too ravaged to support a 
dynastic movement, and by 1355 almost all of the rebel groups had evacuated it. The 
double cordon which resulted effectively sealed off South China from any interference 
from the north; and it was in South China that the two great rivals for the Mandate 
of Heaven—Ch'en Yu-liang and Chu Yuan-chang—fought for supremacy alone. 
A Side-Current: Chu Yuan-chang. Chu Yuan-chang was born in 1328 to a poor 
but socially ambitious peasant family of the Huai region.86 Pestilence and famine in 
the 1340's left him the only surviving member of his immediate family, and so he 
entered a local Buddhist monastery as a novice in order to keep himself alive. Forced 
to leave the monastery when it too ran out of food, he took his staff and begging bowl 
and spent several years traveling about the Huai region. Some scholars presume 
that the young monk came into contact with the White Lotus Society and possibly 
even with P'eng Ying-yii during this time; Chu left behind several short memoirs 
of his early years, but he always passes over these several Wanderjahre in silence. 
His known connection with popular rebellion began only in 1352, after his return 
home, when someone denounced him to the authorities as a rebel and a friend invited 
him to join the Red Turbans at Hao-chou. Chu began as a private soldier, but he 
rapidly became a principal commander and advisor to his patron, Kuo Tzu-hsing. 
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He also became Kuo's son-in-law by proxy; Kuo married to Chu a ward left in his 
custody by a friend, a man of violent temper who had joined the rebels because he 
was wanted for murder.87 Chu's personal tie to Kuo, one of the chief Hao-chou rebel 
leaders, was crucial to the early stages of his career. He furthered himself by his suc-
cesses in battle against the Yiian forces; by his personal recruitment of a large number 
of men; and, not least, by exploiting the animosities that existed among Kuo and the 
other Hao-chou rebel chiefs.88 
Chu's realization of the stupidity of the Hao-chou leadership awakened his 
appetite for power, while his openness to advice from his own personal entourage 
enlarged it.8® Chu began attracting a staff of semi-intellectuals of the Huai area about 
him while he was still in Kuo Tzu-hsing's service. Around 1353, Feng Kuo-yung 
joined him. Feng was "fond of study" and "thoroughly versed in the military clas-
lies." His advice was simple and timeless. "Advocate benevolence and righteousness," 
Feng cautioned. "Win over men's minds, refrain from the pursuit of luxury, and the 
pacification of the empire will be no difficult matter."90 Li Shan-chang, studious as 
a youth, was particularly well read in the statist philosophy of Legalism, and advised 
that Chu take Liu Pang, the peasant founder of the Han Dynasty (202 B.C.-A.I>. 220) 
as his personal model91 Fan Ch'ang, grandson of an obscure Huai-area Confucian 
gentleman, suggested that it is the basic nature of man to love life and hate killing. 
The empire is now in turmoil, and people are anxious and afraid because they can-
not protect themselves. You must concentrate upon dispersing disorder and saving the 
people; you must cease all unnecessary burning and slaughter. Select good troops; 
have half of them fight while the other half guards the cities. Select lenient elders 
for local officials. Then the people will be able to plow and harvest in peace, and 
their crops will not be stolen by marauders; men will gather from the four quarters, 
and the empire will be easy to pacify."92 Within two years after he first joined the 
rebellion, Chu had his own "brain trust," which included some ten men.93 
Chu's staff did more than offer advice; they were also administrators. Thus Mao 
Chi had charge of granaries and acted as a kind of military censor, checking up on 
commanders who failed in battle.94 Li Shan-chang was, among other things, respon-
sible for interviewing the various bandit chiefs and local defense commanders who 
sought to join Chu. Li also saw to it that none of the rest of the civilian staff monopo-
lized communications between Chu and the various field commanders in such a way 
as to impede military operations95 
The further away Chu was from the formal leadership of the Hao-chou rebels, 
the brighter his prospects became. He was at least in part responsible for the decision 
to reduce Ch'u-chou in 1353; and w h c n rar* out there, of Ho-chou in February 
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was eager to move downstream at once and capture the great and strategic city o£ 
Nanking. Chu took Nanking in April 1356. On the march, and in the heat of battle, 
Chu managed to rise to a position of supremacy among the rebels. The course of his 
upward progress is difficult to reconstruct because the official accounts would like us 
to believe that Chu's rise was foreordained and did not need lubricating by the blood 
of rivals. But by 1357, w a s supreme in Nanking; the old Hao-chou leaders were 
dead, and both the eldest son and brother-in-law of Kuo Tzu-hsing, who were Chu's 
superiors in Ho-chou, had conveniently perished during the Nanking assault. 
Finally, in 1357 K u o ' s second and remaining son, nominally Chu's superior in Nan-
king, was executed for "rebellion."97 
Yet there is more to the story. Partly in order to stabilize and legitimize their 
rankings, the rebels while at Ho-chou had entered into negotiations with Liu Fu-
t'ung's newly founded Sung Dynasty, and accepted appointments from it. From 1355 
until 1367, Chu Yuan-chang acted in the name of the restored Sung Dynasty, ruling 
his own domain as a civil and military provincial appointee on behalf of the emperor 
Han Lin-erh. All rewards and appointments, it appears, were given out only with 
Sung authorization. Chu's position resembled that of Ch'en Yu-liang: where Chu 
led a side-action on behalf of the transformed Sung, Ch'en led one on behalf of the 
transformed Tien-wan. In both cases the offspring eventually swallowed the parent. 
Beyond this point, however, the superficial resemblances between Chu and Ch'en 
cease. Unlike Ch'en, Chu was able to fuse together his old military machine and his 
new landlord gentry adherents under his own personal control. The organizational 
arrangements necessary to achieve this were created gradually. The first step was 
taken at T'ai-p'ing, the first city Chu and his men captured after crossing the Yang-
tze. There a dual civil-military bureaucratic structure was set up. The civil side was 
headed by eighty-year old Li Hsi, a well-known local Confucian philosopher and 
teacher.98 The military side, distinct from Chu's own conquest forces, was organized 
as a Wing Commandery (i-yuan-shuai-fu), whose purpose was to stay behind in a 
newly conquered city in order to rebuild fortifications, recruit men for local defense, 
and carry out subsidiary mopping-up operations. Li Hsi had many students and 
acquaintances, some of whom were recommended and employed in both the local 
prefectural government and in the Wing Commandery.99 Here in T'ai-p'ing in 
1355 lay the seed of what was to come later; here also came the first contacts with the 
larger world of Confucianism. Later on, scholar-gentry of greater renown and ambi-
tion would overshadow these men. 
In July 1356, the Sung regime authorized the establishment of Kiangnan province, 
with Chu as chief administrator. The provincial bureaucracy, of which a list remains, 
was clearly dominated by civilians from Chu's own Huai area to the north.100 By 
1359, when his confrontation with Ch'en Yu-liang began, Chu had set up twenty-one 
more Wing Commands, together with seven higher military bureaus known as 
Branch Military Secretariats (shu-mi fen-yuan) which were part of the offensive 
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military structure.101 Both the local civilian governments and the offensive and defen-
sive military bureaus pyramided in Nanking. 
The chief method Chu used to ensure the loyalty of this organization was to 
assign men of competing interests to any one place, with the expectation (often 
realized) that they would check and inform upon each other. For example, a typical 
large city in his domain would have one or more military offices, whose chief, always 
a Huai man, would find that it was part of his duty to discover and forward to Nan-
king the talented members of the local scholar-gentry.102 The general's family, mean-
while, was kept in Nanking as hostage to his good behavior; similarly, the chief local 
clans were obliged to send sons to serve as ceremonial guards (actually hostages) at 
Chu's court. In addition, Chu assigned to each major city one of his personal wards-
young orphans—whose functions are obscure but who seem to have been intended 
to act as informers. Further, Chu usually did not allow local men to serve in their own 
areas.103 It would appear that Chu also made divisions of function among his adher-
ents that took into account regional (and educational and economic) differences. 
Whereas positions in the provincial bureaucracy were filled largely by Huai men, who 
were neither members of powerful clans nor especially well educated, the great gen-
try leaders of South China had ready and informal access to Chu and were conse-
quently in a position to formulate policy for the embryonic dynasty. Chu also used 
capable southerners for important special assignments. The southern scholar-gentry, 
by being given an important political role on a central level, were the more easily 
persuaded to donate their private militia forces, along with their loyalties, to the 
regime.104 
From his capture of Nanking in 1356, Chu wore two faces. To his generals, he 
faithfully maintained the pretense of acting as the emperor Han Lin-erh's obedient 
servant. After their brilliant defeat of Ch'en Yu-liang before the gates of Nanking 
in 1361, Chu's generals clamored to bring the Sung emperor down from the Huai 
region, where he presided over a steadily losing northern movement, and install him 
in Nanking. Han Lin-erh came; he upgraded Kiangnan province to the central 
province (chung-shu-sheng) of the Sung Dynasty and granted Chu the title of 
Duke.105 The southern scholar-gentry were outraged, and with Chu's obvious per-
mission shipped the emperor back under cover of Chu's subsequent expedition west-
ward. Han visited Nanking again in 1363 after Chu had dropped other plans to rescue 
him from a siege, and again the hapless emperor was sent away after Chu departed 
on another expedition.106 What is the explanation for Han Lin-erh's popularity 
among the generals? A few may have believed in his Buddho-Manichean divinity, 
but this cannot have been the whole answer, because only a small fraction of Chu's 
commanders in 1361 were known participants in the early religious risings; many 
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more were former militia commanders who had originally opposed the rioters.107 
Rather, it appears that as uneducated military men of the Huai region they felt over-
whelmed and threatened by the increasing adherence of the southern scholar-gentry 
and their determination of policy. Loyalty to the powerless Han Lin-erh was a means 
of opposition. For the time being, Chu went along with them. 
But Chu had another face, which he exposed exclusively to the southern scholar-
gentry. To them, he made very plain his intention of eventually assuming imperial 
power by acting as if he were, in fact, emperor already.108 He announced to them his 
candidacy for imperial rule at a time when final victory was not at all certain. Yet 
without offering at once the opportunity of personal association with the possible 
future dynastic founder, Chu would probably have found himself regarded in south-
ern eyes merely as one more regional warlord (like Chang Shih-ch'eng, who had 
moved into the Yangtze Delta, and Fang Kuo-chen), and thus he would have failed 
altogether in the crucial task of enlisting their support. 
Chu destroyed Ch'en Yu-liang's Han Dynasty in 1364, and was promoted from 
Duke to King. Chang Shih-ch'eng was defeated in October 1367, and two months 
later Fang Kuo-chen surrendered. In November 1367, the simultaneous conquest of 
North China and the rest of South China began. The Sung Dynasty had meanwhile 
come to an ignominious end. In January 1366, Han Lin-erh's boat overturned as he 
once again approached Nanking, and he drowned.109 Beginning in 1367, Chu ceased 
using his reign title and issuing orders in his name, and ordered the systematic 
destruction of all written reference to the very existence of the Sung Dynasty.110 
On January 23, 1368, Chu formally assumed the throne as Emperor of the Ming 
Dynasty, under the reign title "Hung-wu," or "Great Martiality." The official shih-lu., 
in noting the sources of acclaim for this move, mention the "ministers," and later the 
ministers on behalf of the people.111 Nothing is said of the generals, who in the shih-
lu s spurious version of Chu's becoming Duke in 1356 (rather than in 1361) were 
said to have supported that move.112 Chu frankly told his military men that "at deci-
sive turns of events" their wisdom was sometimes lacking, and that they would simply 
have to accept being overshadowed by others.113 The majority of Chu's meritorious 
generals died in the purges of later years. 
The possible Manichean associations in the word "Ming" were not to be taken 
seriously, for the Manichean promise had ended in a Confucian fulfillment. The old 
White Lotus leaders were officially condemned.114 Liu Fu-t'ung, once Chu's superior, 
shows up along with Ch'en Yu-liang in a long list of conquered rivals and warlords 
intended as an announcement to the gods.116 The human material that had joined the 
1351 riots, or opposed the rioters by joining local militia forces, was alike swallowed 
up and neutralized by being given hereditary military status in the Ming state. But 
millennial doctrine soon found new converts, and the process continued. No sooner 
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was the Ming Dynasty established and a new dynastic order reassembled, than these 
illegal groups began causing trouble once more, some of them even prophesying 
the imminent appearance of the Maitreya Buddha as the chiliasts of the Yiian period 
before them.116 The riots had come full circle. 
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